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REGULATORY STANDARDS AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: STRIKING THE
RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO
Teresa Moran Schwartz*
Common law courts have a long tradition of borrowing legislative
and regulatory standards to define standards of care under the tort
system. Treating such standards as setting minimum levels of care
and safety under tort law, the courts uniformly have ruled that
violations of standards constitute negligence per se, while compliance
is merely evidence of negligence. Although critics of the tort system
have urged legislatures and courts to adopt rules giving greater
weight to regulatory compliance in products liability cases, the
drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability have
declined to do so. They have adopted instead an approach that
largely tracks common law precedent. This Article analyzes the new
Restatement's treatment of regulatory and legislative standards, and
concludes that the drafters generally have pursued a wise policy, and
in a number of respects have improved upon existing common law
rules.
INTRODUCTION
Under the common law of negligence and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, courts have a long tradition of borrowing stan-
dards of conduct set out in legislation or administrative regula-
tions to define what constitutes reasonable conduct, even where
the borrowed legislation or regulation creates no tort liability.'
This judicial borrowing has been discretionary and limited by
a set of common law rules aimed at assuring that the borrowed
* J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Professor of Public Service, George Washington
University Law School (currently on leave and serving as Deputy Director, Bureau of
Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission). A.B. 1965, Stanford University; J.D.
1971, George Washington University Law School. The views expressed in this Article
are the author's alone and do not reflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission or
any individual Commissioner.
1. The seminal case is Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (finding
that the absence of buggy lights in violation of state law constituted negligence per se).
See also Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 119 N.W. 428, 429-30 (Minn. 1909)
(ruling that violation of pure food statute created strict tort liability); Doherty v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 278 N.W. 437, 441 (Wis. 1938) (holding that a defendant can be found liable
for injuries caused by unwholesome food if she violates the state's pure food statute
"independently of any showing of actual negligence").
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standard not only is consistent with tort law doctrine but also
furthers the general purposes of the statute or regulation in
question. 2 In general, a borrowed standard is viewed as estab-
lishing a minimum, not a maximum, level of safety.3 Violations
tend to be treated as negligence per se,' while bare compliance
is seen merely as evidence of negligence "where a reasonable
man would take additional precautions. "5
As products liability law took hold in the 1970s and 1980s,
courts adapted these negligence-based rules to strict products
liability cases, using statutory and regulatory standards as
appropriate, to determine whether products were in a "defective
The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted the long tradition of borrowing statutory
and regulatory standards. Section 286 provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is
invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm
results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (1965) ("When the court does
adopt the legislative standard, it is acting to further the general purpose which it finds
in the legislation, and not because it is in any way required to do so."); see, e.g., Stanton
v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 563-64 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that violation
of a governmental safety regulation constitutes negligence per se where the regulation
was intended, in part, to protect individuals similar to the injured plaintiff); Lukaszewicz
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961,964 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (articulating the rule that
a statutory standard should be adopted in a tort action only where the statute aims to
protect the class of persons and type of harm involved in the tort action); Clinkscales
v. Carver, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (Cal. 1943) (noting that "the standard formulated by a
legislative body. . . becomes the standard to determine civil liability only because the
court accepts it"); Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 329 P.2d 605, 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958)
("Unless the person injured is within the class of persons whom the statute was designed
to protect and the hazard is one which the statute was designed to protect against, no
liability arises out of its violation."); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 222 (5th ed. 1984) (arguing that courts use statutory stan-
dards only when they further the safety aims of the statutes in question).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965) ("Where a statute, ordi-
nance or regulation is found to define a standard of conduct for the purposes of
negligence actions ... the standard defined is normally a minimum standard, applicable
to the ordinary situations contemplated by the legislation.").
4. See id. § 288B(1) ("The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an
administrative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of
conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.").
5. Id. § 288C.
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condition unreasonably dangerous" to consumers-the liability
standard set forth in section 402A of the Restatement (Second).6
The new Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability sets
out, for the first time, specific rules for borrowing statutory and
regulatory standards in products liability cases.7 It adopts a
legal framework that largely follows existing precedent.8 To the
extent there are modifications, they are relatively minor depar-
tures from common law rules.
9
6. Id. § 402A. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.,
For examples of products liability cases in which courts applied the common law rules
governing regulatory compliance and noncompliance, see Stanton, 718 F.2d at 563-64
n.22; Lukaszewicz, 510 F. Supp. at 964-65; Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1978); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1324-25 (Or. 1978); McEwen
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 534-35 (Or. 1974).
7. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD)OF TORTS: PRODUCS LABILIY § 7 (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2]. Section 7 provides:
In connection with a product seller's or distributor's liability for defective design
or inadequate instructions or warnings:
(a) a product's noncompliance with an applicable product safety statute or
regulation renders the product defective with respect to the risks sought to be
reduced by the statute or regulation; and
(b) a product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or regula-
tion is properly considered in determining whether a product is defective with
respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but does not
necessarily preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.
Id.
8. Section 7 of the Restatement (Third) follows the traditional approach that
noncompliance with safety regulation renders a product defective per se while compli-
ance with such regulation is relevant but inconclusive evidence of a lack of defect. See
id. § 7; infra notes 87, 111, 120 and accompanying text.
9. For example, section 7 eliminates the "excused violation" defense in noncompli-
ance cases recognized under the Restatement (Second). See infra note 98 and accompany-
ing text. Additionally, section 7 of the Restatement (Third), unlike the Restatement
(Second), applies only to state and federal laws and regulations, and not to local
ordinances.
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The key provisions, as set forth in section 7 of the new Re-
statement (Third), limit judicial borrowing to federal and state
statutes and regulations0 that were (1) "in force and applicable"
to the product in question at the time of sale,11 and (2) aimed
at preventing the risk that caused the harm in the actual case. 2
If such standards are appropriate for borrowing, section 7 adopts
the same premise adopted historically by the courts that those
statutes and regulations should be viewed as establishing
minimum levels of safety.'3 Thus, products that violate applica-
ble regulatory standards and thereby fail to meet even minimal
standards of safety are by definition defective, or defective per
se. 14 Products that comply with regulatory or statutory stan-
dards, however, do not necessarily meet the level of safety
required by the liability standards of the Restatement (Third)."
Compliance is relevant but not conclusive evidence of reasonable
safety; the weight of the evidence varies with the circumstances
of the case and the nature of the standard.
16
10. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7. Section 7 applies to "[piroduct
safety statutes or regulations," defined in the comments as those "promulgated by feder-
al and state legislatures and governmental agencies, intended to promote greater safety
in the design and marketing of products." Id. § 7 cmt. a. This language departs from the
Restatement (Second), which includes local ordinances as well as state and national
standards. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. a (1965). The change
reflects that only state and national standards apply to the design and marketing of
products; local ordinances, on the other hand, are aimed at how products are used,
repaired, installed, etc. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7 reporters' notes, at
202.
11. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. b.
12. See id. § 7 cmt. c.
13. See id. § 7 cmt. e, at 198.
Section 7(b) reflects the traditional view that, at least in one important sense, the
standards set by most product safety statutes or regulations are minimum
standards. Thus, most product safety statutes or regulations establish a floor of
safety below which product sellers fall only at their peril, but leave open the
question of whether a higher standard of product safety should be applied. This
is the general rule, applicable in most cases.
Id. at 198-99.
14. See id. § 7(a). The per se rule does not apply, however, if the statute or regula-
tion is repealed or no longer in effect prior to adjudication, see id. § 7 cmt. b, or where
the risk involved in a particular case is not among the risks that the statute or
regulation seeks to prevent, see id. § 7 cmt. c.
15. See id. § 7(b). Where a federal law or regulation preempts state tort law, of
course, section 7 does not apply. See id. § 7 cmt. e, at 197-98. By its very terms,
preemption means that state law is displaced by federal law, and the federal legal
standards govern. See id.
16. See id. The drafters leave open the possibility that in some circumstances the
court could determine that a product in compliance with a standard is not defective as
a matter of law; in other circumstances, however, compliance might be given little or
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In taking this traditional approach, the drafters of section 7
rejected many critics' proposed reforms that would require
greater judicial deference to regulatory or statutory compliance.
Some critics have argued for a broad rule that would treat
compliance as presumptive evidence of non-defectiveness for
most regulated products. 7 Others have argued for a narrower
version of this approach, limited to closely regulated products
that are subject to pre-market approval, such as prescription
drugs and devices,'" and aircraft. 9 The rejection of all such
proposals is one of the more significant policy decisions made by
the drafters of the new Restatement.
This Article explores that decision, as well as the specific
provisions of section 7. Part I begins with an overview of critics'
proposals to require greater judicial deference to government
standards in cases of regulatory compliance. It finds these
proposals less draconian than many other recent tort reform
proposals, and not without some merit, especially with respect
to prescription products. Part II then examines the long-
standing judicial reluctance to adopt such an approach, even
though courts have moved in a pro-defendant direction in other
areas.2 ° It examines underlying concerns regarding regulatory
standards, including the fact that they can become quickly
outdated and can be influenced unduly by business interests and
the political environment. It concludes that these concerns only
no weight because of the flawed manner in which the standard was established. See id.
§ 7 cmt. e, at 199.
17. See RICHARD A- EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 83-84 (1980); James
A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed
Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REv. 625, 632-33 (1978); see also Peter Huber, Safety and
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 277, 329-35 (1985) (arguing that tort standards should not replace the regulatory
standards governing general public health and safety risks); cf H.R. 1115, 100th Cong.
§ 206(b)(1), (3) (1987).
18. See AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY VOL. 2, at 83-110 (1991); Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and
Products Liability: The Role of the Food and DrugAdministration, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 233, 233-34 (1986); Richard A Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8
CARDOZO L. REv. 1139, 1151 (1987); Page Keeton, Some Observations About the Strict
Liability of the Maker of Prescription Drugs: The Aftermath of MER /29,56 CAL. L. REV.
149, 153-54 (1968); W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship
Between Product Liability and Innovation in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 125,131
(Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991).
19. See AMERICAN LAw INST., supra note 18, at 86-87, 103-05, 109 (proposing a
stronger compliance defense for products subject to the greatest regulatory oversight,
such as prescription products, pesticides, and aircraft).
20. See sources cited infra note 51 (citing recent studies that show litigation trends
favoring defendants).
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may grow as cutbacks in government resources impede agency
efforts to keep standards up to date and induce even greater
government reliance on industry expertise and data in the
regulatory process.
Part III examines section 7(a), which provides that noncom-
plying products are defective per se,2 ' and compares this new
approach to the per se rule under the Restatement (Second).2 2
It finds that section 7(a) strengthens the traditional rule by
making it easier for plaintiffs to establish product defectiveness
in noncompliance cases. The net effect of the new per se rule
may be to give product makers an additional incentive to comply
with government standards, thereby promoting broad compli-
ance with the regulatory system and furthering the aims of the
statutes in question.
Part IV examines the regulatory compliance provisions in
section 7(b). It finds that the drafters have acted wisely in
choosing to continue the long-standing common law approach
of treating regulatory standards as minimum standards of
safety. In addition, it approves of the specific provisions of the
section that have been crafted to clarify the standards and
provide guidance to the courts on how to apply them. Part IV
considers the possible need for a strengthened compliance
defense in prescription products cases. It finds that section 8 of
the Restatement (Third), which carves out new protective
liability standards for all prescription drugs and devices, should
obviate any need for additional legal protection, including a
strengthened compliance defense, for this category of products.
Finally, the Article concludes that the drafters of the Re-
statement (Third) have chosen the better rule to govern regu-
latory compliance and noncompliance. It reflects sound policy
and provides an improved formulation of the legal rules in this
area of the law.
I. CRITICISMS OF COMMON LAW REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE DEFENSE
Critics urging a stronger regulatory compliance defense con-
stitute part of a larger group of critics that in recent years has
21. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B(1) (1965).
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attacked the entire products liability system as too costly and
erratic," as well as responsible for making insurance less
affordable and less available for many products,24 dramatically
increasing prices for some products,25 deterring innovation, 6
slowing the development and marketing of products,27 unduly
burdening interstate commerce,28 and reducing American
competitiveness in the global marketplace.29 While these claims
have been sharply disputed3 ° and the evidence to support them
23. See, eg., NEWr GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 143 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994) ("Frivolous lawsuits and outlandish damage rewards make a
mockery of our civil justice system."); see also AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 18, at 50
(stating that the tort law system contains "high administrative costs and long delays
in processing claims, and there is a strong likelihood that a victim will receive nothing
or be undercompensated"); PRESIDENTS COUNCIL ON COMPETrIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA 1-6 (1991) (criticizing the present American system of civil
justice as burdensome and inefficient); TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, U.S. ATTORNEY GEN.,
REPoRT ON THE CAUSEs EmE AND POLICY IMPuCATIONS OF THE CURRNT QuS IN IsURANCE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 30-52, 60-75 (1986) (blaming the tort law system for the
liability insurance crisis and calling for specific tort law reforms).
24. See TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, supra note 23, at 45-52 (arguing that the
incorrect findings of liability, excessive damages, and high transaction costs of the
current products liability scheme have created a high burden that decreases the
effective availability of insurance).
25. See Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) (citing the tort system
as contributing to sharp increases in the price of Bendectin and DTP vaccine).
26. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
155-61 (1988) (blaming strict products liability for stagnation in research and develop-
ment in the drug, contraceptive, chemical, small aircraft, automotive, and medical
industries).
27. See Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. § 2(a)(4) (1996) (vetoed) (noting that because of the liability system's excessive
and unpredictable damage awards, "consumers have been adversely affected through
the withdrawal of products, producers, services, and service providers from the
marketplace"); see also Brown, 751 P.2d at 479 (declining to adopt strict liability for
prescription drugs out of concern for, among other things, the adverse effects on
pharmaceutical research and development).
28. See H.R. 956, § 2(a)(3) (finding that "excessive, unpredictable, and often
arbitrary damage awards and unfair findings of liability have a direct and undesirable
effect on interstate commerce by increasing the cost and decreasing the availability of
goods and services").
29. See Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact
of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own Game?,
9 J.L. & COM. 167, 169 (1989) (stating that many critics of products liability law believe
it has reduced U.S. market competitiveness by increasing costs and decreasing product
innovation).
30. See, e.g., Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1195 (Alaska 1992) (finding it
"speculative at best" to think that eliminating strict liability in drug cases could
enhance "the availability and affordability of prescription drugs"); Judith P. Swazey,
Prescription Drug Safety and Product Liability, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 295-96 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1991) (noting that drug companies, who are in a position to divulge data about the
adverse effects of litigation and to document the need for proposed reforms, have been
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contested,31 critics of the current system have pressed, often
successfully, for tort and products liability reforms to address
their concerns. a2
Proposed reforms have included an array of measures to limit
damage awards and to establish legal standards that make
claims more difficult to bring or to win.33 These proposed re-
forms often include a strengthened regulatory compliance
defense as part of their package of reforms.34
unwilling to do so); Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil
Justice, 71 DENY. U. L. REv. 77, 94-95 (1993) (pointing to a contraction in the number
of products liability claims and awards and arguing that 'this contraction should induce
skepticism about the asserted role of products liability litigation in undermining the
competitiveness of American business"); Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Reporters'
Study of Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 241, 248
(1993) (arguing that "the alleged disincentive to product innovation and development
brought about by a strict products liability regimen.... is not supported empirically,
and runs counter to common sense in most respects").
31. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon Hansen, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative
Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 89-90 (1991)
(finding that only a few products have been seriously affected by increased liability
while stating "that for most products the expansion of liability is having only a minor
effect on prices"); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of
the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1288 (1992) ('In
short, our society has been unable to produce research that is even minimally adequate
to answer our most basic questions about the behavior of the civil justice system.");
Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 689 (1990) (reviewing PETER
W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLuIION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)) (noting that
Huber "fails to establish that the harm tort law causes by either removing useful
products from the market or failing to discover beneficial products outweighs the
benefits"); Colman McCarthy, House Zealots Serve Half-Baked Evidence, WASH. POST,
Mar. 21, 1995, at C9 (stating that congressional debates on civil justice reform lacked
"hard information" and that in the "debate to reduce the number of lawsuits, no deceits
or shards of disinformation about the trial bar were held to be too wild"); Richard B.
Schmitt, Truth Is First Casualty of Tort-Reform Debate, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1995, at B1
(opining that "much of the debate [about tort reform] is driven by anecdote, and it
doesn't seem to matter whether details can be verified").
32. Tort reform legislation has been adopted in almost every state. See Joseph
Sanders & Craig Joyce, "Off to the Races". The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform
Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207, 218-19 (1990) (describing the successful efforts that led
48 states to adopt tort reform packages between 1985 and 1988).
33. See Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 56, 59
(providing an overview of the past 10 years of state tort law reforms restricting joint
and several liability, punitive damages, noneconomic damages, and products liability
doctrines); see also Linda Lipsen, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy
Issue in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 262-71 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) (providing
detailed information on states that have adopted general tort reform and product
liability legislation). In 1995, a spate of bills was introduced in the new Republican Con-
gress to reform the civil justice system, including bills with loser pay provisions that
would shift attorney fees to the losing party and provisions to curtail strict liability. See
ABA Says No To Litigation "Reforms" in Republican Contract with America, 63
U.S.L.W. 2506, 2506-07 (Feb. 21, 1995).
34. See AMERICAN LAw INST., supra note 18, at 83-110 (urging a regulatory compli-
ance defense for prescription products, pesticides and aircraft); Henderson, supra note
17, at 639 (proposing a rebuttable presumption of nondefectiveness for regulatory
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Some of the critics' proposals have been particularly draco-
nian, providing for extreme damage caps on noneconomic
losses,35 and loser-pay provisions to shift attorney fees to the
losing party.36 Many of the proposals to strengthen the compli-
ance defense, on the other hand, have not been as harsh,37 and
have been based on more solid policy grounds.
The proponents of a stronger regulatory compliance defense
argue that government agencies are superior to courts in
making the technical and policy decisions necessary in product
design and warning cases because agencies have greater insti-
tutional expertise to determine what constitutes reasonable
levels of safety for products within their jurisdiction" and
because they have the capacity through their rulemaking
procedures to gather a broad spectrum of information.39 In
short, these proponents contend that government standards,
crafted by experts and developed through a quasi-legislative
compliance). A good example of such a proposed reform is the regulatory compliance
defense for prescription products that was among the tort reforms on the agenda of the
new Republican Congress in 1995. See Product Liability Reform Bill Approved by Wide
Margin in House Judiciary Committee, 23 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at
190-91 (Feb. 24, 1995) [hereinafter Approved by Wide Margin]. This so-called "FDA
defense" provision was defeated early in the legislative process. See infra note 50.
35. See, e.g., TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, supra note 23, at 68 (limiting
noneconomic damages, including punitive damages, to $100,000).
36. See GINGRICH ET AL., supra note 23, at 145-55.
37. See, e.g., Product Liability Fairness Act, S. 640, 102d Cong. § 303(c) (1991)
(providing that punitive damages shall not be awarded in products liability cases
involving drugs or devices given premarket approval by the Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA), as long as there is no fraud in obtaining such approval).
38. See Huber, supra note 17, at 333-35 (finding that regulatory agencies' expertise
makes them better than courts at assessing the risks posed by new products); Clarence
Morris, The Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 TEX. L.
REV. 143, 144 (1949) (arguing agencies' expertise should be respected and used); Viscusi
& Moore, supra note 18, at 125 (arguing that the specialized knowledge possessed by
regulatory agencies leaves them better suited than courts for making product safety
decisions that implicate greater societal interests); see also Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.,
813 P.2d 89, 98-99 (Utah 1991) (finding that prescription drug designs present just the
kind of complex "polycentric" problem that courts are poorly suited to address and
precisely the kind of problem that the FDA was established to address).
39. See Clarence Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49
COLUM. L. REV. 21, 47 (1949) (pointing to the advantages legislatures have over courts
in being able to hold hearings, gather facts, and debate issues when "informed value
judgments" need to be made); see also Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 176 (Cal.
1993) (deferring to legislative and administrative standards for nonprescription drug
labeling on the grounds that the court had neither the resources nor the procedures to
undertake the broad review necessary to justify replacing the legislative standard in
question).
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process, are more likely to be sound and consistent measures of
reasonable safety than those set on a case-by-case basis by
judges and juries.4 °
Arguments for a strengthened compliance defense can be
more persuasive when limited to prescription products.4 First,
the regulatory system for most of these products is more com-
prehensive than others, requiring extensive scientific review
and agency approval before products are allowed on the market.
Arguably, this system assures a higher level of product safety
and consumer protection.42 Second, prescription products, as a
class, are especially valuable to society43 and are perhaps more
deserving of a liability rule, such as a strengthened compliance
defense, that would narrow the grounds for liability and help
reduce any adverse impacts created by the current products
liability system.' Finally, a stronger compliance defense would
40. See Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 208 (1989) (arguing that today's regulatory schemes are more
complex and entitled to greater judicial deference than the simple legislative schemes,
such as those governing railroad crossings, for which the regulatory compliance rule
was first designed); see also Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort
Claims As the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 965 (1996)
(noting that "modern regulatory systems more typically represent legislative or
administrative efforts to set optimal, not minimal, safety standards").
41. See Noah, supra note 40, at 977 n.285 ("Products regulated by the FDA are the
most frequently mentioned as deserving the protections of a government standards
defense."). But see Margaret Gilhooley, Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory
Compliance, and Patient Choice, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1481, 1488-93 (1994) (noting
situations where a regulatory agency would be unable to review products adequately,
and, consequently, a regulatory compliance defense would be inappropriate).
42. See EPSTEIN, supra note 17, at 110-12; Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan,
Overview, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND
INNOVATION 1, 13 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); Richard Crout, The
Drug Regulatory System: Reflections and Predictions, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J., 106,
113 (1981). Indeed, many have criticized prescription drug regulation as imposing safety
standards that are too high, thereby unduly hampering drug development and depriv-
ing consumers of their benefits. See, e.g., Bruce Ingersoll, Amid Lax Regulation, Medical
Devices Flood A Vulnerable Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1992, at Al.
43. Prescription products are unique in that they can save lives, reduce pain, and
cure illness. See Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988); see also
Grundberg, 813 P.2d at 95 (Utah 1991) (arguing that the "unique nature and value" of
prescription drugs, plus FDA's "elaborate regulatory system" overseeing them make
strict liability an unsuitable standard to apply). Of course, prescription products also
are capable of causing injury on a massive scale, as we have seen with DES and the
Dalkon Shield. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed
Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1359-60 (1994).
44. For criticisms of liability rules and their adverse impact on prescription
products, see Huber, supra note 17, at 285-90 (describing how strict liability forced
most private companies to stop producing vaccines even though the societal benefit of
those vaccines was enormous); Victor Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: The
Meaning and Policy Behind Comment k, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1143 (1985)
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clarify and stabilize the liability standards applicable to
prescription products," which traditionally have varied among
the states46 and still remain unsettled and unnecessarily
confusing.47
On the strength of some of these arguments, and without
good empirical data about the liability system and its economic
impacts,48 a few states have enacted a stronger regulatory
compliance defense in their tort reform packages.49 This de-
fense, however, has not been one of the more widely adopted
tort reforms among the states.50 Courts have been even less
(arguing that the application of strict liability to drugs marketed in good faith would
discourage the release of many potentially beneficial drugs). See also S. REP. No. 102-
215, at 38 (1991) (expressing concern about "overdeterrence of socially desirable
products" when they are subject to both regulation and tort liability); Tentative Draft
No. 2, supra note 7, § 8 cmt. b, at 212 (referring to the "possible negative effects of
judicially imposed liability on the cost and availability of valuable medical technology").
45. One great benefit of borrowing standards is that they establish a "more exact
standard that smooths up civil procedure." Morris, supra note 39, at 47.
46. See generally John P. Reilly, The Erosion of Comment k, 14 U. DAYTON L. REV.
255 (1989) (analyzing recent trends in state court cases that apply different standards
of liability to makers of prescription drugs); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Products Liability
Law and Pharmaceuticals: New Developments and Divergent Trends, 43 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 33, 40-53 (1988) (describing the varied judicial approaches that have been
applied in recent years to prescription product design claims).
47. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron Twerski, Will a New Restatement Help
Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1262 (stating that comment
k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) governing prescription products liability
has "befuddled courts and scholars alike"); Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The
Case Against Comment k and for Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 872 (1983)
("Comment k also is vague in that it fails to make clear what kind of special rule it puts
in place, what purposes it meets, and to what classes of products it applies.").
48. See sources cited supra notes 30-31 (describing the lack of empirical data).
49. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(a) (Michie 1987) (providing that compli-
ance with statutory or regulatory standards shall be evidence that a "product is not in
an unreasonably dangerous condition"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a) (1994) (providing
that if a product complies with administrative or legislative standards, the product is
not defective "unless the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a
reasonably prudent product seller could and would have taken additional precautions");
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-09 (Supp. 1995) (providing a rebuttable presumption of
nondefect where a product's plans, designs, warnings, instructions, manufacture, or
testing complied with applicable government standards, or where no applicable govern-
ment standard exists); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.76(C) (Anderson 1995) (providing
that an "ethical" drug is not defective because of an inadequate warning if the FDA
does not require a direct warning to the ultimate user and if the manufacturer provides
an adequate warning to the prescriber or dispenser of the drug); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
15-6(3) (1992) (providing a rebuttable presumption of nondefect if the design, manufac-
ture, inspection, and testing of the product conform with government standards).
50. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM.
U. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1993) ("Even with the 'nationwide burst' of tort reform statutes
adopted throughout the country in the 1980s, this particular reform measure [the
strengthened regulatory compliance defense] has not fared well." (citation omitted)). At
the federal level, a limited version of the regulatory compliance defense that appeared in
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receptive than legislatures to arguments to increase judicial
deference to regulatory and statutory standards. We turn next
to consider their concerns.
II. THE JUDICIARY'S CAUTIOUS TREATMENT OF
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
Although courts seem to have been influenced by critics in
many areas of tort law,51 they generally have not accepted the
critics' argument for a stronger regulatory compliance defense.52
In the absence of legislation,' courts have continued to adhere
to the common law premise that regulatory and statutory
standards establish minimum levels of safety and should not
substitute across the board for tort standards of safety.5'
federal legislation in recent years was dropped in 1996. The final version of the Common
Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996 did not include an earlier version's
regulatory compliance defense that limited punitive damage claims. See Neil A- Lewis,
House Passes New Standards Limiting Awards in Civil Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1995,
at Al, A7 (reporting on the Senate's likely rejection of the House-passed provision
immunizing drug companies from liability for FDA-approved drugs). The compliance
defense provision was generally viewed as highly controversial and, if retained, likely to
be used to defeat the entire bill. See Approved by Wide Margin, supra note 34, at 191.
51. Empirical evidence indicates that over the past decade the judiciary has been
moving generally in a more pro-defendant direction by declining to adopt or to develop
further the liability-expanding rulings of the 1960s and 1970s. See James A- Henderson,
Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Product Liability: An Empirical
Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479, 488-98,503-07 (1990); Gary T. Schwartz,
The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA.
L. REV. 601, 693-99 (1992); W. Kip Viscusi et al., A Statistical Profile of Pharmaceutical
lndustry Liability, 1976-1989,24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1418, 1420-25 (1994). In addition,
the influence of tort reforms and tort critics is increasingly evident in court rulings. See,
e.g., Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 867 F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1989)
(discussing the increased product costs imposed by strict products liability in its role
as an "insurance" system); see also Teresa M. Schwartz, Product Liability Reform by the
Judiciary, 27 GONZ. L. REv. 303, 318-33 (1991-92) (reviewing empirical studies of
judicial decisions and common law trends in products liability cases).
52. See James A Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 320
(1990) (observing that "for reasons that we find difficult to understand, courts have not
deferred to the determinations of product safety agencies"); see also Dueffert, supra note
40, at 175-77 (discussing the burdensome dual regulation of product safety through
statutory requirements and tort law, and the need for a common standard).
53. For examples of recent state legislative provisions adopting some form of
strengthened regulatory compliance defense, see supra note 49.
54. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Toner
v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 311 n.12 (Idaho 1987); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass. 1985); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A2d 374, 383
(N.J. 1984); see also Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. e (stating that the
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Underlying this judicial approach to regulatory standards
may be concerns about the suitability and adequacy of such
standards as measures of safety under the tort system. These
concerns, discussed more fully below, may stem from a number
of factors. For example, (1) regulatory standards are not de-
signed for the tort system and may not be a good fit, (2) govern-
ment standards can become outdated and therefore too lax as
safety standards, (3) agencies and legislatures may be unduly
influenced by the regulated industry, and (4) the regulations
may be the product of political influence.55 A number of regula-
tory failures over the past several decades, resulting in serious
injuries to consumers, would seem to confirm the validity of
these concerns.56
A. Standards Not Designed for Tort Law
By definition, the regulations and statutes that courts are
borrowing are not intended to be used to establish standards of
"traditional view" applicable in most cases is that legislative and regulatory standards
are minimum standards and "establish a floor of safety below which product sellers fall
only at their peril").
55. Even proponents of greater judicial deference to government standards recog-
nize weaknesses in the regulatory system. See, e.g., W. KIP Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 118-24, 212 (1991) (acknowledging that reliance on regulation for product
safety standards and enforcement is misplaced because regulatory agencies are prone
to political pressures, delay, and inefficiency, and often set noncomprehensive or
inappropriate standards); see also PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES 4-14 (1981) (discussing the difficulty of assessing an agency's
ability to balance the public interest against the interests of a regulated industry, given
the conflicting interests of the two groups and the unquantifiable benefits of regulatory
actions); SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO
DEREGULATE 4-8 (1983) (finding that some complaints about government regulation are
justified); Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products
Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1147-60 (1988) (discussing problems in the
regulatory process, including the strong influence of regulated industries, rapid
technological change creating obsolescent regulations, and antiregulatory sentiment
among those in power).
56. Failures include medical devices such as the Dalkon Shield, and drugs for
which FDA approval was obtained through fraud, such as MER/29, Oraflex, and
Selaclyn. See RUSSELL MOKHIBER, CORPORATE CRIME AND VIOLATION: BIG BUSINESS POWER
AND THE ABUSE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 149-62,289-99,332-36,394 (1988); see also Morton
Mintz, The Cure That Could Kill You: FDAReformsAre Bad Medicine, WASH. POST, July
14, 1996, at Cl (listing eight major companies who, over the last 12 years, have failed
to report adverse drug reactions within FDA's deadline); John Schwartz, Firm Fined
for Selling Faulty Surgical Devices, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1993, at Al (discussing a
recent case in which a major manufacturer, C.R. Bard, defrauded the FDA and sold
defective medical devices that had not been tested properly or approved by the FDA).
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tort liability. 7 Courts therefore exercise considerable care when
determining that a standard fits a case. They consider first
whether the standard was intended to address the type of
injury in the case and second, whether adopting it as the tort
standard of safety would advance the aims of the statute in
question.58 Even then, courts cannot assume that legislatures
or regulatory agencies have products liability cases in mind
when they adopt regulatory standards,59 or that those bodies
would make the same decisions if they took tort law into ac-
count.60 Given these circumstances, courts understandably have
taken a cautious approach to adopting regulatory standards.
B. Difficulties of Keeping
Regulatory Standards Up to Date
The problem of regulatory lag is of particular concern to
courts. Under administrative rulemaking procedures, it can
take many years for agencies to set new product safety stan-
dards or amend existing ones.6 ' As a consequence, government
57. Sometimes statutes specifically provide that regulatory standards are not
intended to set standards for tort liability. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (1994) ("Compliance with a motor vehicle safety
standard ... does not exempt a person from liability at common law.").
58. Furthering the safety aims of the statute has become the principal rationale
for borrowing standards in tort cases. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1136-37. For a
discussion of how carefully courts have applied the requirement that borrowing
standards must further statutory aims, see id. at 1136-40.
59. See id. at 1160 n.199 (according to then Deputy Chief Counsel for Regulation
and Hearings at the FDA, the agency does not consider routinely the effects of proposed
standards on tort liability during the deliberative process).
60. See, e.g., Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir.
1968) (concluding that neither Congress nor the agency promulgating the standard in
question ever intended that it would define the standard of due care imposed by the
common law of torts).
61. The FDA's efforts to issue a rule classifying breast implants as a high risk
device under the Medical Device Amendments serve as an example. The rule took six
years to complete (from 1982 to 1988), and then it took another three years to finalize
a rule requiring submission of safety data. See Gayle L. Troutwine, Breast Implants: A
Beauty Fraud, TRIAL, Aug. 1993, at 48-50. The FDA's massive review of prescription
drugs took more than two decades-from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, and led to the
withdrawal of more than a thousand drugs from the market. See Schwartz, supra note
55, at 1151 n.139.
Across the federal government, rulemaking and standard setting may become even
more time consuming, as congressional interest grows in adding procedural require-
ments such as cost-benefit analysis, waiting periods for congressional consideration, and
expansion ofjudicial review. See generally Phillip K Howard, Administrative Procedure
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standards frequently become outdated, and are therefore poor
measures of safety for the tort system.62 Indeed, in the modern,
high-tech marketplace where new information develops quickly
and technological change occurs at a rapid rate, this problem
can be expected only to grow. 3
C. Industry Influence in Standard Setting
In formulating product safety standards, government agencies
necessarily rely to a great extent on the industries that will be
subject to the regulations, since industry generally has greater
technological expertise about product design, knowledge about
the costs and benefits of their products, data about risks, and
experience in marketing the products." As a result, manufac-
turers can exert enormous influence on the regulatory
outcome.65 To some extent, the common law rule treating
regulatory standards as minimum levels of safety serves to
discount that influence.
D. Diminishing Government Resources
The two concerns just discussed-regulatory obsolescence and
industry influence on standard setting-grow directly out of the
fact that government regulatory resources are so limited.
Government must rely on industry data, for example, because
and the Decline of Responsibility, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 312 (1996) (describing problems
with and suggesting modifications of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 501-559, 701-706, 3105, 3144 (1996)).
62. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658-59 (1st Cir. 1981)
(noting that risks became known in 1970 that were not available when FDA's regula-
tion of oral contraceptives was issued in 1968); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374,
379 (N.J. 1984) (finding that the manufacturer and the FDA had knowledge of risks,
but that the FDA failed to act before plaintiffs injury).
63. See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FINAL REPORT (1991) [hereinafter FDA FINAL REPORT]
(reporting on the challenges facing the FDA, including insufficient resources and
rapidly changing technology).
64. See JOAN CtAyBoK, RmiEa FROM SAFElY: REAGANs ATT'ACK ON AMERiCAl HEAnI
xxiv-xxv (1984) (noting that "the government has far less information than the
regulated industry with which to make key regulatory decisions').
65. See QUIRK, supra note 55, at 12-13.
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it often lacks sufficient resources to support its own research or
to test the reliability of data submitted by others.66 Ironically,
this problem can be most serious for those agencies whose
regulatory responsibilities are the most comprehensive, such as
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA).67
Insufficient funds also cause obsolescence. When Congress
expands the jurisdiction of an agency, or when products within
the agency's authority proliferate in the marketplace, the
agency is seldom given the additional resources needed to
support its new responsibilities. 8 Indeed, a comprehensive FDA
study in 1991 found that the agency was "able to monitor a
smaller share of the production, distribution, and sale of regu-
lated products than a decade ago."69 With limited resources, of
course, agencies have to prioritize their responsibilities, making
it necessary to let some regulations grow old and out-of-date.7 °
Again, this problem is not new. It is, however, almost sure to
grow as all levels of government face more and more cutbacks
in their resources.7' Indeed, with annual budget deficits ahead
as far as the eye can see, a smaller role for government seems
inevitable well into the next century
7 2
66. Where an agency does rely on industry data, it may lack funds necessary to
check the quality of the data. A recent example was the Environmental Protection
Agency's inability, due to lack of funds, to check data filed by companies on their
release of certain chemicals into the air. See Cindy Skrzycki, De Facto Deregulation:
Changing the Rules of the Game: Slowing the Flow of Federal Rules (pt. 1), WASH. POST,
Feb. 18, 1996, at Al.
67. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1147-49.
68. See FDA FINAL REPORT, supra note 63, at 15-17, app. C at 2-3. Between 1980
and 1990, the FDA's responsibilities were increased substantially by more than 30 new
federal laws and by the enormous growth in the number and complexity of products
within the agency's jurisdiction; during this period, however, there was no correspond-
ing increase in its funds or staff to implement those responsibilities. See id. at 15-17,
app. A at 9-10.
69. Id. at 26.
70. See David Noland, Airline Safety: The Shocking Truth, DISCOVER, Oct. 1986, at
30 (finding that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has focused on standards
that prevent crashes and has allowed standards that reduce injuries in crashes to grow
stale); see also Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1151-52 (reporting that the National
Highway Traffic Safety Agency resource-intensive effort to adopt a passive restraint
rule for automobiles meant the agency did not have sufficient resources to revise other
out-of-date motor vehicle standards).
71. See Stephen Barr, De Facto Deregulation: Changing the Rules of the Games:
Cuts Frustrate OSHA Plans to Improve Worker Safety (pt. 2), WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1996,
at Al (reporting on budget cuts that have forced the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration to limit safety inspection, reduce the training of employees, and cut
back on the number of safety standards it will issue).
72. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
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E. Political Influences
Politics is almost always a factor in the regulatory process.
Sometimes it is no more than a general, background influence;
other times it is more open and specific.73 During the 1980s, for
example, regulatory relief for business was near the top of the
political agenda.74 In the Reagan administration, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) played a key role in limiting
regulatory activities, 75 and in the Bush administration, the
Council on Competitiveness, chaired by Vice President Quayle,
played a similar role.76
Across the board, deregulation was a high priority in this
period, with serious consequences for product safety regula-
tion.77 For example, at the FDA-one of the agencies hardest hit
by the Reagan era movement toward deregulation-resources
were slashed, enforcement actions fell steeply,78 and proposed
regulatory actions were stopped, slowed, or watered down.7 9 Not
surprisingly, this "decade of laissez-faire policies" produced a
series of notorious scandals at the FDA.8" To reestablish the
73. For example, President Reagan made his anti-regulatory agenda very open,
promising broad-based regulatory relief, including a package of measures to reduce
safety and environmental regulations for the auto industry, described as the industry's
"wish list" of reforms. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, A Product Safety Agenda for the
1990s, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1355, 1356-57 (1988).
74. See id. at 1362-66.
75. See TOLCHIN & TOLCHIN, supra note 55, at 73-85.
76. See Bob Woodward & David S. Broder, Quayle's Quest: Curb Rules, Leave "No
Fingerprints," WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1992, at Al.
77. See generally CLAYBROOK, supra note 64 (arguing that deregulation by the
Reagan administration may result in health and safety regulations that are not based
on scientific expertise and, therefore, could impede the development of new product
safety designs).
78. See Julie Kosterlitz, Reagan is Leaving His Mark on the Food and Drug Admin-
istration, 17 NAT'L J. 1568, 1569-71 (1985) (stating that the average number of annual
FDA enforcement actions fell from 542 in the previous administration to 260 under
Reagan and that the number of staff fell from roughly 8000 in 1980 to 7000 by 1985).
79. For example, the Secretary of Health and Human Services declined to require
warning labels about the risk of Reye's Syndrome to children using aspirin, despite
studies by the Centers for Disease Control establishing the risk; the Office of Manage-
ment and the Budget delayed regulations involving infant formula and medical devices,
and stayed an FDA proposal to ban dyes found by scientists to cause cancer in animals.
See id. at 1569-70.
80. Ingersoll, supra note 42, at Al. One major fraud on the FDA in the
1980s-when the FDA, in effect, had "stopped being a regulatory agency"-involved the
bribery of FDA staff by generic drug industry members. Michael Specter, Leaderless
FDA's Daunting Task, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1989, at A21 (quoting former FDA
Commissioner Jere Goyan). Another scandal in this era involved a manufacturer of
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credibility of this critically important safety agency, 81 President
Bush appointed vigorous new leadership for the agency.
8 2
The 1992 and 1994 elections changed the political scene
again, once more with implications for the regulatory envi-
ronment.83 This time, the combination of declining resources
and broad political support for smaller government' produced
a more subtle but still quite significant "de facto deregulation
of American business."85 Indeed, some view it as "a significant
departure from decades of government policy."
86
Whatever the impact, and however deep and long lasting, one
thing is clear: the regulatory environment shifts with the
political environment. Such shifts should raise serious concerns
for the judiciary about relying on the regulatory system to set
the safety standards for the tort system.
heart catheters who lied to the FDA about the experimental use of its devices, sold
devices without FDA approval, and covered up its actions. The FDA ordered a recall of
the products by 1990 and then pursued criminal charges. See Philip J. Hilts, Man-
ufacturer Admits Selling Untested Devices for Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1993, at Al.
The criminal prosecution resulted in a $61 million fine-the largest fine ever imposed
in an FDA enforcement case. See Schwartz, supra note 56, at Al. Still another instance
of wrongdoing in the 1980s involved Eli Lilly's failure to reveal serious adverse
reactions experienced by English users of its drug Oraflex. See CLAYBROOK, supra note
64, at 48-49. The drug was approved, promoted heavily, and caused an estimated 50
deaths before it was withdrawn from the U.S. market. See id. at 48-50.
81. Cf Mintz, supra note 56, at C5 (describing the FDA as "the world's most
admired regulatory agency").
82. "This anti-regulatory period came to a halt" with David Kessler's appointment
to head the FDA. Schwartz, supra note 43, at 1391.
83. See De Facto Deregulation: Changing the Rules of the Game (pts. 1-4), WASH.
POST, Feb. 18-21, 1996, at Al (four-part series on how the pressures from Congress and
the administration, plus budget cuts fundamentally changed the way federal agencies
with responsibilities for product safety, the environment, and workplace safety, do their
job); see also Mintz, supra note 56, at C5 (describing "FDA reformers emboldened by the
Republican takeover of Congress" seeking to change fundamentally the way food and
drugs have been regulated since the 1930s by transferring key functions to private
contractors).
84. President Clinton captured the political mood in his 1996 State of the Union
address in declaring that "the era of big government is over" and in committing to a
balanced budget by 2002. John F. Harris & Dan Balz, Beyond Election, There's History:
Clinton Reveals Aspirations of Greatness for Second Term, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1996,
at Al; see also VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERN-
MENT THAT WORKS BEIER AND COSTS LESS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW
ii-iii (1993) (suggesting a 12% reduction in the size of the federal civilian workforce by
1998).
85. Skrzycki, supra note 66, at Al; see also id. at A10 (describing the myriad
actions, including budget cuts, government shutdowns, legislative bans on enforcing
specific regulations, proposed regulatory reform legislation, to name but a few, which
have had a "significant impact on weakening the resolve and reach of regulators"). In
short, a change in "tone and substance" has been created that has accomplished many
of the reforms the Republican Congress wanted, but without legislation. Id.
86. Id. at Al.
Striking the Right Balance
III. THE PER SE RULE FOR NONCOMPLYING PRODUCTS
Judicial concerns about the adequacy of regulatory standards
are at the heart of two key common law rules: (1) that govern-
ment standards set only minimal levels of safety; and (2) that
products in violation of such government safety standards are
defective per se.
8 7
The per se rule, now captured in section 7(a) of the Re-
statement (Third),"8 has come to play an important role in both
the tort and regulatory systems. In the tort system, the rule
offers plaintiffs the advantage of relying on government
standards to establish the "floor of safety" required under tort
law. 9 Like strict liability for flawed products, the per se rule
streamlines plaintiffs' cases by eliminating the cost of having to
establish independently what constitutes an appropriate stan-
dard of safety.90
The per se rule also furthers the aims of the regulatory
system; indeed, this was one of the original justifications for
adopting the rule.9' It furthers those aims by providing com-
panies with an additional incentive for complying with govern-
ment standards and thereby supports the efforts of regulatory
agencies to achieve broad compliance with their standards.
In modern times, the tort system, with its per se rule, creates
even greater incentives for regulatory compliance than the
regulatory system itself. Noncompliance under tort law is likely
to expose a wrongdoer to greater monetary consequences than
those imposed by the regulatory system.92 For example, in cases
87. See Ross Lab. v. Thies, 725 P.2d 1076, 1079-80 (Alaska 1986); Toole v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 288B, 288C cmt. a (1965).
88. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7(a).
89. Id. § 7 cmt. e, at 198 ("Mlost [standards] establish a floor of safety below which
product sellers fall only at their peril . . ").
90. Departure from the regulatory standard is treated like departure from the
manufacturer's design standards, and strict or per se liability is imposed. See Tentative
Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 2(a) (imposing strict or per se liability when a product
"departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised").
91. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
92. Civil and criminal penalties tend to be low even when injuries are high.
Consider Selacryn: this drug caused 60 deaths and more than 500 cases of liver
damage. Misdemeanor charges, however, resulted in only a $100,000 fine against the
company and probation for three executives. See MOKHMBER, supra note 56, at 392-99.
In the case of the drug Oraflex, numerous deaths were caused in the United States
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where civil or criminal penalties were in the range of
$20,000-80,000, tort damages for the same statutory violations
amounted to millions, even hundreds of millions of dollars.93 In
addition, unlike civil penalties, tort damages can never be
dismissed easily as a cost of doing business. With some excep-
tions, they carry far more deterrent clout than statutory penal-
ties.94
The role for the tort system in assuring regulatory compliance
is especially important in these times of limited government.
Increasingly, budget cutbacks mean fewer resources for inspec-
tions, investigations, and legal actions,95 and almost certainly
greater opportunities for wrongdoers to escape detection and
prosecution. 96 In this environment, the products liability system
may become the predominant factor in promoting compliance
with the regulatory system.
The per se rule of section 7(a) of the new Restatement (Third)
preserves tort law's important role of fostering regulatory
compliance. It even strengthens the common law rule in that it
rejects rules adopted in a minority ofjurisdictions that give less
weight to statutory violations97 and eliminates the "excused
before it was withdrawn from the market; the company "pleaded guilty to 25 misde-
meanor counts of failing to notify the FDA of numerous deaths and injuries among
overseas users of Oraflex' and paid a fine of only $25,000. Id. at 337.
93. The tort and regulatory systems have imposed widely disparate monetary
payments for the same corporate misbehavior. See, e.g., id. (describing how the jury
verdict in a wrongful death action involving Oraflex resulted in an award of $6 million
while the fine against the company was $25,000); see also JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE
CRIME IN THE PHARMACEtrrICAL INDUSTRY 64 (1984) (recounting that the penalties for fraud
in testing and marketing the drug MER/29 were fines against the corporation of
$80,000 and probation for three employees and that the damages awarded in some 1500
civil suits amounted to about $200 million).
94. Where no personal injury results from a statutory violation, civil penalties may
be greater than any tort damages. For example, in 1987, Beech-Nut Nutrition Corpora-
tion paid a $2 million fine, one of the largest penalties ever imposed for violation of the
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, for selling a bogus fruit drink as apple juice. See United
States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 677 F. Supp. 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 871 F.2d
1181 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Leonard Buder, Beech-Nut is Fined $2 Million for Sale of
Fake Apple Juice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1987, at 1.
95. See Skrzycki, supra note 66, at A10. For example, when the government shut
down in the fall of 1995, fewer inspectors were available to check imported toys to find
those that failed to meet safety standards; the number of toys identified as posing risks
fell dramatically in this period. See id. To the extent the government cannot serve to
prevent such risky products from entering the marketplace, it is especially important
that the tort system serve as an effective deterrent to manufacturers.
96. See Specter, supra note 80, at A21 (describing the bribery of FDA staff by
generic drug industry members).
97. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7 reporters' note, at 199-200, 202
(indicating that a minority ofjurisdictions hold that regulatory violations create either
a rebuttable presumption or merely evidence of negligence or product defectiveness).
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violation" defense that traditionally has been available.98 Under
this defense statutory or regulatory violation can be excused for
a number of reasons, including emergency, lack of knowledge,
and inability despite due care to comply.99
The drafters of the Restatement (Third) found none of the
listed excuses viable in today's products liability context where
defendant sellers, as a class, are experts and knowledgeable
about the law.0 0 Although the drafters found that courts "rou-
tinely reject" this excuse defense,' they chose to foreclose all
future opportunities to raise it. By strengthening the per se rule
in this way, the drafters made it an even more powerful tool for
fostering regulatory compliance.0 2
In the final analysis, the per se rule supports both the tort
and regulatory systems.' 3 In the current environment, however,
98. The seminal case on the per se rule, Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y.
1920), allowed defendant to argue that the violation should be excused. See also
Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 172 (Cal. 1993) (finding that proof of a statutory
violation creates a presumption of negligence that can be refuted only by showing
justification or excuse).
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965). In listing the excused
violations, the Restatement (Second) provides:
(1) An excused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation
is not negligence.
(2) Unless the enactment or regulation is construed not to permit such excuse, its
violation is excused when
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others.
Id.
100. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7 reporters' note, at 205.
101. Id.
102. The new rule stands in sharp contrast to the Restatement (Second) approach,
which left the door open to the possibility that additional excuses, not in the black
letter list, could be available to defendants. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A
cmt. a (1965).
103. The per se rule is only one way that the products liability and regulatory
systems interact to assure product safety for consumers. Concerns about tort liability,
for example, may motivate a manufacturer to recall voluntarily a potentially dangerous
product under a regulatory statute. See Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104,
1107 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding punitive damages may be appropriate for a failure to recall
a product with known risks); see also Teresa M. Schwartz & Robert S. Adler, Product
Recalls: A Remedy in Need of Repair, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 401, 402 (1984) (finding
that prompt, voluntary product recalls are especially important if injuries are to be
prevented). The tort system also can provide benefits to the regulatory system by uncov-
ering safety risks previously unknown to the government. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET
AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COUmRT: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC TOmTS at iii, xxv-xxvi, 10-12
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its more important role-and one the new Restatement (Third)
clearly fosters-may be its support of the regulatory system.
IV. A LIMITED ROLE FOR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
A. Interaction of Tort and Regulatory
Systems in Compliance Cases
Arguably, the regulatory compliance defense, like the per se
rule for noncompliance, also furthers the aims of the regulatory
system. This defense provides an additional incentive for com-
pliance by giving companies a safe harbor from tort liability
when they comply with statutes and regulations. °4
It is not clear, however, that a compliance defense is neces-
sary to provide such an incentive because the per se rule alone
already provides a powerful incentive. °5 Nor is it clear that a
compliance defense that shields defendants from liability
actually furthers the safety aims of statutes. In fact, such a
defense might have quite the opposite effect and actually
undermine consumer safety.' 6 Experience shows that product
makers already are inclined to "sit back" and wait until regu-
lations are updated and strengthened' 0V-an inclination likely
to be encouraged by a stronger regulatory compliance defense.
A strengthened defense also could serve as an incentive for
business to lobby for lower standards during the regulatory
(1985>, q MORTON Mn'z, AT ANY Cosr CooRA GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD
6-8, 166-72, 245-46, 249-50 (1985) (describing how litigation, not regulation, adversely
affected the A.H. Robbins Co. and eventually forced a recall of its Dalkon Shield device).
104. See THE RESEARCH GROUP, INC., US. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
ON PROD. LIAB., PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY-VOLUME VIL at 45
(1977).
105. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (regarding the substantial damage
awards available in torts cases involving products that violate regulatory standards).
106. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 390 (N.J. 1984) (finding that it
would "undercut" the safety aims of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, only to require
that a drug warning meet regulatory requirements and not to require additional
warnings of known risks).
107. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 775 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (defendant chose to await the effective date of new federal regulations before
implementing the new safety requirements); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d
727, 740 (Minn. 1980) (defendant waited until federal regulations required the use of
flame retardant materials already on the market).
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process.108 These concerns provide more than sufficient grounds
for the Restatement drafters' decision not to strengthen the
defense, especially given the already mentioned concerns about
the adequacy of regulations due to regulatory lag, industry and
political influence, and diminishing government resources
This is not to say, of course, that compliance should not be a
consideration in determining whether a product is defective.
Indeed, compliance can be relevant, even compelling, evidence
of nondefectiveness in individual cases. We turn next to consid-
er the new Restatement's approach to weighing compliance on
a case-by-case basis.
B. Restatement (Third) and Regulatory Compliance
Consistent with the Restatement (Second) °9 and court rul-
ings,"0 the new Restatement recognizes that in some circum-
stances courts can find that regulatory standards set optimal
levels of safety and that compliance therewith constitutes a
complete defense."' The Restatement (Third) also goes farther
than the Restatement (Second) and most court opinions,
however, by providing guidance on how to weigh regulatory
compliance in products liability cases." 2 It identifies a number
108. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1160. Not only would it encourage more
industry influence during the development of regulatory standards, but it could
complicate and prolong the rulemaking process as agencies try to take into account the
effects of their rules in defining safety standards for the tort system--something they
do not do now. See id.; see also supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965) ("Compliance with a legislative
enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence
where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.").
The accompanying comment also recognizes, however, that there can be situations
when a "minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or regulation may be accepted
by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter of law, as sufficient for the occasion."
Id. § 288C cmt. a.
110. See, e.g., Dentson v. Eddins & Lee Bus Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 942, 944 (Ala.
1986) (finding regulatory compliance determinative); Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d
167, 176-78 (Cal. 1993) (same).
111. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. e ("After reviewing relevant
circumstances ... a court may properly conclude that a particular product safety
standard set by statute or regulation adequately serves the objectives of tort law and
therefore that the product that complies with the standard is not defective as a matter
of law.").
112. The Restatement (Second) does supply examples of circumstances where a
reasonable person would take additional precautions, such as driving under the speed
limit where traffic calls for it, or providing more than the required hand signal where
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of circumstances where a regulatory standard might be
considered adequate under the tort system: (1) where a stan-
dard was "promulgated recently, thus supplying currency";113 (2)
where it addresses the "very issue of product design and
warning presented in the case"; 114 and (3) where the standard
setting process "was thorough and responsible and reflected
substantial expertise."" 5 The new Restatement (Third) also
identifies circumstances where compliance should be given
"little or no weight," such as where the regulatory process was
"tainted" either by false information or by the withholding of
necessary and valid information." 6
Not surprisingly, the Restatement's guidance addresses many
of the concerns discussed earlier about obsolescence, the fair-
ness of the regulatory process, and the proper "fit" of tort and
regulatory standards." 7 The Restatement's approach is also
similar to the kind of assessments that courts already are
making in compliance cases."8
Courts, however, do not always articulate fully the grounds
for their treatment of standards, and, therefore, critics have
suggested that courts may be giving little thought to the is-
sue." 9 On some occasions, courts simply apply the general rule
there is reason to know that it has not been observed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965). Such examples, however, are outdated and offer little
guidance in the products liability setting. See Dueffert, supra note 40, at 208 (comment-
ing on the fact that the Restatement (Second)'s regulatory compliance rules are based
upon a time of simpler regulations and simpler accidents). Similarly, judicial opinions
often fail to indicate how compliance should be weighed. See infra notes 119-20 and
accompanying text.
113. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. e. The concern here, of course, is
the problem of regulatory lag.
114. Id. This criterion goes to the issue of whether a regulation fits the case, i.e.,
whether the expertise of the agency was focused on the same issues now before the
court. For a discussion of "fit," see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
115. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. e.
116. Id.
117. See supra Part II.A-E.
118. A sampling of cases reveals that courts weigh regulatory compliance in varying
degrees, depending on the circumstances of the case. See infra notes 120-22 and
accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973) (stating
that "mere compliance' with FDA approved warnings may not be sufficient because
those warnings may be "only minimal in nature"); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra
note 52, at 320 ("The [typical court's] analysis usually begins and ends with the
statement that agency standards are minimum, not maximum, standards and that
courts are therefore free to disregard them."); Noah, supra note 40, at 965 (noting that
courts dismiss the regulatory compliance defense "out of hand with the oft-repeated and
largely unexamined premise that government safety standards are nothing more than
minimum requirements").
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that standards set minimal levels of safety and then allow the
fact finders to give those standards whatever weight they feel
they deserve.120 On the rare occasions when courts do depart
from the general rule and find compliance determinative, how-
ever, they offer a fuller explanation.'
21
In many cases, the courts neither minimize a rule, nor deem
it controlling; instead, they acknowledge the general rule for
regulatory compliance and then treat compliance as one factor
in the analysis. In individual cases, courts often seem to give
compliance considerable weight, but no uniform approach to
weighing regulatory compliance emerges from these cases. 122 It
is possible, however, that over time the guidance provided by the
Restatement (Third) will promote greater uniformity in this area.
120. See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., 993 F.2d 528, 538 (6th Cir. 1993)
(opining that "the jury may weigh FDA approval as it sees fit, especially in a case
where the plaintiff has presented evidence to support an articulable basis for disregard-
ing an FDA finding"); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71 (Mass.
1985) (treating compliance with an FDA-approved warning on oral contraceptive as a
factor to be considered); Jackson v. Spagnola, 503 A.2d 944, 948 (Pa. 1986) (arguing
that regulatory compliance is "'only a piece of the evidentiary puzzle'" (quoting Shipp
v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir. 1985))).
121. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 176-78 (Cal. 1993) (explaining
the court's rationale for deferring to legislative and administrative standards requiring
English-language labels on institutional competence grounds); Grundberg v. Upjohn
Co., 813 P.2d 89, 96-99 (Utah 1991) (providing a thorough review of the FDA's
regulatory process and the value of prescription products in deciding that the court
should defer completely to the FDA's risk-benefit analysis in design claims). Perhaps
more detailed explanations of decisions to defer to regulatory standards can be
explained by the fact that in such circumstances courts are departing from the general
rule and therefore need greater justification for their ruling.
122. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hoffnan-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806,815-16 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding that an FDA-approved warning was adequate as a matter of law even though
the testimony of plaintiffs single expert and the practices of thousands of physicians
were contrary to the FDA's view); Lorenz v. Celotex Corp., 896 F.2d 148, 152 (5th Cir.
1990) (noting that regulatory compliance constitutes "strong and substantial evidence
that a product is not defective"); Brucev. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442,448 (10th
Cir. 1976) (granting summary judgment where aircraft complied with FAA regulation);
Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 383-84 (D. Md. 1975) (granting a
directed verdict for the defendant involving an FDA-approved oral contraceptive);
Johnsonv. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318,1325-26 (Kan. 1986) (weighing both
compliance with FDA regulations and widespread support for the vaccine in question
from the public health community and the medical profession in finding that a directed
verdict should have been granted); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 625 A.2d 1005,
1014 (Md. 1993) (ruling that conformity with statutory standards constitutes due care
in the absence of special circumstances); McDaniel v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 241 N.W.2d 822,
828 (Neb. 1976) (holding that a product in compliance with regulatory standards cannot
be challenged simply because the opinions of some experts differ); Wilson v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (Or. 1978) (finding that compliance with FAA
regulations is an important factor in finding that no prima facie case for a design claim
had been made).
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The impact of the Restatement (Third), of course, is difficult
to predict. There is some possibility that it will lead to more
frequent treatment of regulatory compliance as determinative
of nondefectiveness. Section 7 invites courts to evaluate the
regulatory process and the merits of the standard in question,
and, if the standard is found sufficient, to adopt it for the
products liability system.'23 Additionally, in providing a frame-
work for making the regulatory evaluation, it may make it
easier for courts to undertake this endeavor.
If, on the other hand, a court wants to adopt a regulatory
standard as the tort standard of safety, the new Restatement
requires that court to explore the regulatory process in greater
depth than it has been accustomed to doing.'24 Such an inquiry
is complex, time consuming, and one a court may prefer to
sidestep,"' especially if it can achieve the same result by just
weighing the compliance heavily and ruling in favor of the
defendant on the basis of all the evidence.
In the final analysis, the Restatement (Third) may have its
greatest impact in the "middle ground" cases where courts
weigh compliance but do not find it conclusive. The Restatement
(Third) offers useful guidance by giving courts criteria for
assessing standards. If the courts follow these criteria and
explain their decisions, they can produce a body of case law that
would help clarify the relationship between products liability
and regulatory standards and provide greater uniformity in the
treatment of standards.
C. A Special Compliance Defense for
Prescription Products?
A final issue deals with whether the drafters of the Restate-
ment (Third) should have adopted a stronger compliance defense
123. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 7 cmt. e, at 199 ("A conclusion of
non-defectiveness may be especially appropriate when the court is confident that the
deliberative process by which the safety standard was established was thorough and
responsible and reflected substantial expertise." (emphasis added)).
124. See id.; cf. Wilson, 577 P.2d at 1332-36 (Linde, J., concurring) (discussing the
need for courts to examine the scope, purpose, and completeness of a government
standard before either adopting or rejecting that standard for a compliance defense).
125. The parties, too, might find this area difficult to explore during tort litigation.
Defendants, however, may have a slight advantage as they are more likely to be
acquainted with and perhaps even have participated in the standard setting process,
whereas plaintiffs are unlikely to be familiar with that process and could find it difficult
and costly to challenge. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 1134.
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for prescription drugs and devices. As noted above, the support
for this defense has been based on, among other things, the
unique value of these products to society, the role the FDA plays
in assuring their safety, and concerns about the adverse impacts
of tort liability on pharmaceutical research and development.
126
In fact, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) recognized the
validity of a number of the arguments made in support of such
a defense.'27 Rather than addressing their concerns with a
special compliance defense, however, they chose another ap-
proach-a set of liability standards specifically tailored for
design and warning claims involving prescription products.
Those standards, which apply both to drugs and devices, are
contained in section 8 of the Restatement (Third).
128
126. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
127. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 8 cmt. b. Although rejecting
"unqualified deference" to regulatory standards in prescription products cases, the
drafters accepted the notion that the regulatory system is "a legitimate mechanism for
setting the standards for drug design" and that "regulatory agencies adequately review
new prescription drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably dangerous designs off the
market." Id.
128. Id. § 8. The second Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) provides:
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who commercially
sells or otherwise distributes a defective product is subject to liability for harm
to persons caused by the product defect. A prescription drug or medical device
is one that may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only pursuant to a
health care provider's prescription.
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a product is defective if at the
time of sale or other distribution:
(1) the drug or medical device contains a manufacturing defect as defined in
§ 2(a); or
(2) the drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective design
or because of inadequate instructions or warnings.
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective
design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device
are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits so that
no reasonable health care provider, knowing of such foreseeable risks and
therapeutic benefits, would prescribe the drug or medical device for any class
of patients.
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe because of
inadequate instructions or warnings when
(1) reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the drug or medical device are not provided to prescribing and
other health care providers who are in a position to reduce the risks of harm
in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or
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To a significant extent, the new standards for prescription
products reflect common law standards applicable in most
states.129 For example, section 8 retains strict liability for
flawed prescription products,13 and establishes a negligence-
based standard for warning claims, very similar to the
standard it adopts for products in general.'' On the warning
issue most unique to prescription products-the role of the
"learned intermediary" health care provider who prescribes
the products-section 8 adopts the majority view and
provides that warnings need go only to the learned
intermediary, not directly to the patient. 3 2 Here, as in
(2) reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the drug or medical device are not provided directly to the patient
when the manufacturer knew or had reason to know that no health care
provider would be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance
with the instructions or warnings.
(e) A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug or medical device
is subject to liability only if:
(1) at the time of sale or other nonmanufacturing distribution the drug or
medical device contains a manufacturing defect as defined in § 2(a); or
(2) during the period leading up to the sale or other distribution of the drug
or medical device the retail seller or other nonmanufacturing distributor
fails to exercise reasonable care and such failure causes harm to persons.
Id. § 8.
129. See generally Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Impact of the New Products
Liability Restatement on Prescription Products, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399 (1995)
(explaining that the Restatement (Third) parallels common law precedent for claims of
manufacturing defect and inadequate warning, but that claims of design defect are
based on a new standard with no precedent in case law).
130. The new Restatement treats a prescription product containing a "manufactur-
ing defect" like any other product. Compare Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 2(a)
(establishing strict liability for manufacturing defects in "products"), with id. § 8(b)(1)
(applying the same rule to prescription products). This treatment of mismanufactured
drugs is based on long standing common law rulings. See id. § 8 reporters' note, at
220.
131. Compare Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 2(c) (requiring "reasonable
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm" for products in general),
with id. § 8(d) (making essentially the same requirement applicable to prescription
products). Courts have long found no real difference between negligence and strict
liability in warning cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d
1318, 1324 (Kan. 1986) (finding that negligence principles, not strict liability, apply to
warning claims); Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (finding that
negligence and strict liability are "functional equivalents" in warning cases).
132. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 8(d)(1). This approach is well
grounded in the common law. See, e.g., Polley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 658 F. Supp. 420,
422-23 (D. Alaska 1987) (finding that, with the exception of cases involving mass
immunizations and oral contraceptives, 'Every single court which has considered the
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almost every instance, the Restatement (Third) rejects pro-
plaintiff minority rules.'33
In contrast, for design claims involving prescription products,
the Restatement (Third) departs considerably from common law
standards.'34 It adopts an extremely narrow standard for liabili-
ty, in effect a kind of "super negligence," requiring plaintiff to
establish that the product should not have been marketed at
all.'35 Under this standard, a plaintiff must establish that the
risks of the prescription product so outweigh its benefits that no
reasonable health care provider, knowing of the risks and
benefits, would prescribe the product "for any class of
patients."'36 The acknowledged aim of this new approach is to
make design cases, already extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
137 2)138win,"' successful only in the most "unusual circumstances.
In sum, the special rules contained in section 8 of the Re-
statement (Third) offer considerable protection for prescription
products. Perhaps equally important from the industry's stand-
point, these rules make it unlikely that courts will further
issue... has concluded that there is no duty on the part of the manufacturer to warn
the patients directly of risks inherent in the prescription medicine"). Section 8(d)(2) of
the Restatement (Third) recognizes an exception to the rule and requires a warning
directly to the patient where the manufacturer has reason to know that there will be
no meaningful learned intermediary. The exception is based on the seminal case,
Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), which provided an exception to the
learned intermediary rule where the manufacturer knew that the vaccine in question
would be delivered to the patient in a clinic setting with no individualized attention
from a health care provider. See id. at 1276-77.
133. See Schwartz, supra note 129, at 401.
The drafters selected as the "better" rules for inclusion in the new Restatement
those majority rules that favor defendants, and in almost every case rejected
minority rules that favor plaintiffs .... While it does not propose draconian
measures or a return to an earlier era of harsh "no duty" rules, it does eliminate
an array of rules that have made it easier for plaintiffs to pursue their claims.
Id. (citations omitted).
134. There is no uniform judicial approach to design claims for prescription
products. Some courts apply a simple negligence standard. See Brown v. Superior Ct.,
751 P.2d 470, 477-80 (Cal. 1988). Other courts apply strict liability. See Shanks v.
Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1195 (Alaska 1992). Still other courts determine the
applicability of strict liability case by case, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant
to show that strict liability should not apply in a given case. See Hill v. Searle Lab., 884
F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir. 1974); Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732 P.2d 297, 307 (Idaho 1987).
135. See Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 8(c).
136. Id.
137. See generally Viscusi et al., supra note 51 (providing 13 years of statistical data
from federal court cases showing that plaintiffs have lower success rates than defen-
dants in product liability claims against pharmaceutical companies).
138. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 7, § 8 cmt. f.
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expand common law liability for these'-products. 139 In the final
analysis, section 8's provisions make any additional legal
protection for prescription products unnecessary, including a
special regulatory compliance defense.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the drafters of the Restatement (Third) to
retain the long-standing common law approach to regulatory
compliance and noncompliance was right on both policy and
legal grounds. Despite criticisms of the approach, its underlying
rationale-that statutory and regulatory standards establish
minimum levels of safety for purposes of tort law-remains
sound. Indeed, in today's environment of limited government
and diminishing resources, there may be more reason to stay
with this approach.
The drafters also are to be applauded for the manner in
which they have crafted the specific provisions of section 7.
They have strengthened the per se rule for non compliance
cases in ways that should make it an even more effective tool
for fostering regulatory compliance-thereby supporting the
regulatory system at a time when government law enforcement
resources are shrinking. And the drafters have provided rules
and commentary for the regulatory compliance defense that
provide useful guidance to the courts and should go a long way
toward greater consistency and clarity in this area of the law.
In sum, in section 7 of the Restatement (Third), the drafters
have accomplished one of the aims of any restatement: they
have adopted the "better rule."14 °
139. The greatest impact of the Restatement (Third) may not necessarily come from
its specific provisions but rather from "its general policy thrust," i.e., "that liability rules
should be less open-ended, the duty of manufacturers more narrowly defined, and courts
less innovative." Schwartz, supra note 129, at 413.
140. Gary T. Schwartz, The AL.I. Reporters' Study, 15 U HAw. L. REv. 529, 530
(1993).
